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                                     -Abstract- 
This paper addresses the problems of the current process of and prospects for further 
post-communist ‘Europeanisation’ (primarily understood as a process of incorporation of the 
core norms and principles upon which the western EUropean political and socio-economic 
structures function) of the Balkan states. While there is a wide academic and political 
consensus that Europeanisation of the post-communist countries from East Central Europe 
(ECE) and the Baltics has been more or less successfully accomplished primarily thanks to the 
process of EU enlargement, the achieved level and prospects for further Europeanisation of 
the post-communist Balkans, and particularly Western-Balkan states remain a highly 
debatable issue.  On the one hand, a large part of mainstream literature and most EU leaders 
and officials argue that this group of countries simply (and differently from their counterparts 
in ECE and the Baltics) cannot be (fully) Europeanised due to the structural disadvantages 
inherited throughout their long history of socio-economic and cultural backwardness. A 
continuously low level of consolidation of democratic institutions, particularly reflected 
through persistently high corruption and problems with respect for the rule of law in all the 
Balkan states, including Bulgaria and Romania which have now been EU members for more 
than a decade, are often highlighted as proof of the inability of these countries to adopt 
European standards and norms, even if they are subjected to the (forced) adoption of these 
through the EU accession process. On the other hand, some authors and pro-EUropean 
political elite in the Balkan states claim that these could quickly catch up with their ‘more 
Europeanised’ post-communist counterparts if the EU starts treating them in a similar way 
and providing them a similar level of assistance for post-communist reform as it did to the 
latter throughout their accession in the 1990s and early 2000s.  
 
The region of South-Eastern Europe or the Balkans is comprised of ten relatively small 
countries all of which - except for Greece - fell under communist rule after the Second World 
War. Following the collapse of communism in the late 1980s and the opening of the 
enlargement process of the European Union in this region, only three post-communist states 
from the Balkans – Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia – were able to accompany Greece in 
acceding to the EU while all the others are still waiting to be ‘further (satisfactorily) 
EUropeanised’ and meet the EU’s accession conditions. While EU officials and a number of 
scholars (e.g. Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig, 2010; Huntington, 1993 and 1996; Janos, 2000; 




lies primarily in the inability of the states’ socio-political structures to adopt core EU norms 
and values - particularly those related to the functioning of institutions of democracy and 
respect of the rule of law – the reality appears to be less straight forward. A closer look at the 
empirical facts reveals that the agent driven actions from both sides - the EU and the political 
leadership of leading member states on the one side, and the political elites of the Western 
Balkan states on the other – have played a much stronger role in the (non) Europeanisation of 
the latter group of states, than have structural factors.   
 
  While Balkan countries were socio-economically less developed than the countries of East 
Central Europe (ECE) and the Baltics, political developments and conditions of multi-party 
authoritarianism in all these countries (with the exception of Czechoslovakia) were very similar 
before they fell under communist rule after the Second World War (Crampton, 1997; 
Rotshield,1974; Petrovic, 2013). Forty years of communist institutional and ideological 
rebuilding have further equalised political and socio-economic conditions throughout the 
communist world. If there was an impact of past legacies on political and socio-economic 
developments and the different pace of Europeanisation after the collapse of communism, it 
was primarily related to the existence of differences in the character and strength of communist 
rule in particular groups of communist states and the impact that these differences have had on 
the formation (or non-formation) of pro-reformist and pro-EU political elites.  As defined and 
argued by this author in his 2013 monograph (Petrovic, 2013), the key role in the creation of 
important anti-communist national(ist) and/or liberal democratic political alternatives in the 
ECE communist states played weaknesses in rule of domestic communist elites, combined with 
a history of violent Soviet (or Soviet-driven) suppression of major protests and/or incentives 
for change or reform (Ekiert, 1996 and 2003) and the existence of strong anti-Russian and anti-
Soviet sentiment in the Baltic states, Poland and Hungary (but not in Czechoslovakia). The 
virtual non-existence of such political alternatives and, consequently, their pro-reformist post-
communist successors in four Balkan communist states1 was primarily the result of the firm 
rule of domestic communist leaders who were able (in contrast to their counterparts in ECE) to 
secure some legitimacy for their rule. Some specific socio-economic structures established in 
these states throughout the period of communist rule, particularly those related to extensive 
industrialization and to (the related) significant increase in people’s living standards (Table 
1.1.), were only of secondary importance in this regard. It was a corrective factor which helped 
the Balkan communists to (partially) legitimise their dictatorial rule (Petrovic, 2013, chapter 
3). Hence, the slow progress of all the Balkan states in post-communist reform and 
EUropeanisation (i.e adoption of the core EU values and norms – see Section 1) during the 
1990s, was a direct result of the lack of liberal-democratic political forces and the establishment 
of the political system of so-called illiberal democracy2 in these states after the collapse of 
communist rule.  However, if the Balkan peoples and their political leaders (most of whom 
were the members of the former communist nomenklatura) bear unto themselves the largest 
share of responsibility for the non-reformist pathways of their countries and consequently the 
establishment of much weaker links with the EU during the 1990s, they can hardly be (solely) 
blamed for the continuation of the slow pace of Europeanisation of their countries after the 
early 2000s, when all the Balkan states had elected pro-reformist and pro-EU governments. 
The latter circumstance is particularly relevant when speaking of the causes of slow 
                                                          
1 Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia. After the violent dissolution of communist Yugoslavia in the early 
1990s and separation of Montenegro and Kosovo from Serbia in 2006 and 2008 respectively, the present 
‘country account’ of post-Yugoslav states in addition to these three also includes Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Macedonia.  
2 which pretended rather than introduced necessary political democratisation and economic 




Europeanisation of the Western Balkan states as will be discussed and explained in the 
following section. The second, final section of the paper critically addresses the prospects for 
the further Europeanisation of these states through the prism of the tightened accession 
conditions for the new candidates after 2006. 
1. Who is to blame: internal disadvantages and weaknesses or the lack of external 
assistance?  
 
Although it is generally used in a much broader sense and related to the transfer of political, 
socio-economic and cultural values, norms and attitudes developed in (predominantly Western) 
European countries and societies to non-European countries (Flockhart, 2010; Featherstone, 
2003), the meaning of the term ‘Europeanisation’ in the modern political science literature 
dominantly corresponds to the process of European integration, and is in fact EU-centric 
(Flockhart, 2010, p. 789). It is primarily used to define the process of transformation of norms, 
procedures and regulations which exist at the EU level to the political, legal and social 
structures of the member states (Radealli, 2003) or to the countries which wish to become EU 
members (Grabbe, 2003 and 2006). For clarity purposes the term will be used in this paper as 
given in its title- 'EUropeanisation'. It will be used in the context of the ability of candidate 
countries for EU membership to meet the EU’s accession conditions as well as to comply with 
and adopt the core EU values and norms (Manners, 2002), which are incorporated in the 
accession conditions. Among these, particular attention will be paid to those parts of these 
conditions (i.e. values and norms) for which the measurement tools have been developed and 
extensively utilised by undisputed international centres and organisations. The Freedom 
House’s democracy score, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (TICPI) 
and indicators of economic transition from the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) indicators of economic transition (i.e. transformation from the 
communist command type to a market economy) will be the focus of this assessment.3 
     
      As discussed in the introduction, slow progress in the post-communist transition and 
Europeanisation of all the Balkan countries in the years following the collapse of communist 
rule was the direct consequence of the political conditions in which regime change occurred in 
these countries. Political elites in ECE and the Baltic states, mainly recruited from the former 
anti-communist (and pro-Western) liberal democratic opposition, rushed to pull their countries 
out of the deep economic and social crisis of the early 1990s (Table 1) by anchoring their post-
communist reforms and economic transformation to the establishment of closer ties and (after 
1993) the process of accession to the EU. However, these illiberal political leaders were not 
genuinely interested in substantial reforms and even less so in achieving EU conditional 
                                                          
3  Freedom House’s Nations in transit’s ‘democracy score: 1 being the highest: full democracy; 7 being the 
lowest: complete dictatorship).  
EBRD economic transition indicators: 4.33 = standards of advanced industrial [market] economies; 1 = 
standards of a centrally planned economy. 
        Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (TICPI) gives information about the corruption   
        level in each country of the world for that calendar year. Since 2012 the TICPI has ranged from 100 (very  
        clean) to 0 (highly corrupt), while in the period until 2011 it ranged from 10 (very clean) to 1 (highly  





assistance for reforms. Moreover, the successor states of former Yugoslavia sank into wars and 
ethnic conflicts. Under such conditions one certainly could not have expected the Balkan post-
communist states to be able to meet any of the basic accession conditions defined at the 
European Council meeting in June 1993: “[s]tability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, 
the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a 
functioning market economy…”(European Council, 1993, 7.A. iii). However, as soon as 
governmental power was taken by ‘real reformers’ and pro-European political actors in 
Romania and Bulgaria in 1996 and 1997 respectively, relations between these two and the EU 
improved, and they opened accession negotiations in February 2000, together with three ‘late 
reformers’ from ECE and the Baltics: Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania. Soon after, significant 
acceleration in the post-communist political and economic transition of these two countries4 
was rewarded by membership of the EU, on 1 January 2007 (only two and a half years after 
the ECE and the Baltic states had joined on 1 May 2004). 
 
   Table 1. Gross Domestic Product per capita in Central, South and South-Eastern    
          Europe  and  some West European  countries    (in  1990 Geary-Khamis US dollars) 
 1937 1989 
Netherlands 5,433 16 695 
France 4,487 17,730 
Germany 4,685 16,558 
Austria 3,156 16,369 
Italy 3,319 15,969 
Greece -  2,769 10,086 
Portugal 1,757 10,372 
Spain 1,808 11,582 
     Czechoslovakia 2,882 8,768 
Hungary 2,543 6,903 
Poland 1,915 5,684 
Romania 1,130 3,941 
Bulgaria 1,567 6,216 
Yugoslavia 1,273 6,250 
Albania 926¹ 2,477 
                                                       Source:  Maddison,  2003.  
                                                          





       On the other hand, Albania and the ever-increasing number of successor states of former 
Yugoslavia (excluding Slovenia) had to wait longer to receive the EU’s invitation for accession 
and, with it, strong support and assistance for their post-communist political and economic 
transformation.5 This was accompanied by new and specially designed EU policy incentives 
for this group of post-communist states, which have been labelled the “Western Balkans”. The 
incentive for accession was launched after the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
ended in the mid-1990s, and its main objective was to restore peace and stability in the region 
together with boosting post-communist reforms.  It was initially named the ‘coherent strategy’ 
and quickly evolved into the ‘Stabilisation and Association Process’(SAP).6  The SAP gained 
importance after the death of the Croatian authoritarian president Tudjman in December 1999 
and the overthrow of his Serbian counterpart Milošević in October the following year, when 
the two largest Western Balkan states finally obtained pro-reformist and pro-EUropean 
governments. The prospects for full Europeanisation of the Balkans appeared to be highly 
promising by the adoption of the ‘Thessaloniki Agenda’ in June 2003,7 which clearly stated: 
The Western Balkans and support for preparation for future integration into European 
structures and ultimate membership into the Union is a high priority for the EU. The 
Balkans will be an integral part of a united Europe (paragraph, 2) 
 
     These political changes in the Western Balkan states and their improved relations and 
intensified cooperation with the EU were quickly effectuated through a very rapid 
improvement of democratic conditions, and the strong economic transformation of these states 
throughout the first half of the 2010s (Table 2).  
      However, enlargement enthusiasm and hopes for a relatively quick Europeanisation of the 
Western Balkan states did not last long. Even before its mega-enlargement was completed with 
the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, the EU decided to “renew [the] consensus on 
enlargement” (European Council, 2006, point 4).  Adopted under the pressure of emerging 
enlargement fatigue and fears for the EU’s “absorption/enlargement capacity” (Phinnemore 
2006; Petrovic 2009; Petrovic-Smith, 2013), the “renew consensus on enlargement” did not 
have any other purpose but to tighten accession conditions for new applicants. From that   
moment on, the basic objective of EU ‘enlargement policy’ towards the Western Balkan states  
                                                          
5 The establishment of closer ties with the EU and, especially, the opening of the accession negotiation 
process, is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 1 of the above mentioned monograph (Petrovic, 2013) where 
it is defined as the most important form of external assistance for the successful post-communist economic 
and socio-political transition of a former communist state (see also Lavigne, Petrovic, 2017) 
6 For more details on this see EU General Affairs and External Relations Council, 1997 and EU General Affairs 
Council, 1999. 
7 The Thessaloniki agenda for the Western Balkans: Moving towards European Integration, adopted by the 
conclusions of the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council of 16 June 2003 and endorsed in the 






         Table 2.  Indicators of post-communist democratisation and marketization 
 
Democracy score* TICPI*** Economic 
Transition** 
 1999 2006 2012 2017 1999 200
6 
2012 2017 1999 2006 2014 
Hungary 1.88 2.14 2.89 3.54 52 52 51 45 3.7 3.9 3.9 
Poland 1.58 2.36 2.18 2.57 42 37 58 60 3.5 3.7 4.1 
Slovakia 2.71 2.14 2.57 2.61 37 47 46 50 3.3 3.7 4.0 
Latvia 2.29 2.07 2.07 2.04 34 47 49 58 3.1 3.6 3.9 
Lithuania 2.29 2.29 2.32 2.32 38 48 54 59 3.1 3.7 3.9 
Romania 3.54 3.29 3.50 3.39 33 31 44 48 2.8 3.3 3.7 
Bulgaria 3.58 2.89 3.18 3.36 33 40 41 43 2.8 3.5 3.7 
Croatia  4.46 3.75 3.61 3.71 27 34 46 49 3.0 3.5 3.8 
Maced FYR  3.83 3.82 3.93 4.43 33 27 43 35 2.7 3.1 3.6 
Albania  4.75 3.82 4.25 4.14 23 26 33 38 2.6 2.9  3.5 
Bosnia-Hrz 5.42 4.04 4.39 4.54 N/A 29 42 38 2.0 2.6 3.1 
Montenegro 5.50 3.93 3.82 3.89 N/A N/A 41 46 1.6 2.5 3.3 
Serbia 5.50 3.68 3.64 3.82 24 27 39 41 1.4 2.7 3.2 
 
           Sources: FH Nations in Transit, Transparency International, Corruption Perception 
Index,EBRD Transition Report  ( various years) 
 
was not to further speed up the accession of these states, but rather to try to avoid “mistakes”   
from the previous enlargement rounds, particularly those related to the “premature” accession 
of Romania and Bulgaria (Vachudova, 2014; Grabbe, 2014).  
       Instead of receiving more assistance for completing remaining necessary reforms, the 
Western Balkan states have been given not only the tightened Copenhagen assessment 
conditions (European Commission, 2006; European Council, 2006), and (rightfully deserved) 
SAP conditions regarding post-war reconciliation and peace-building in the region (from which 
countries from the 2004/07 enlargement round were spared), but also the “Copenhagen plus -
plus -plus conditions” (Petrovic, 2017 and Petrovic, Smith, 2013) in the form of requests for 
compliance with the EU’s incentives for solving intraregional disputes related to the contested 
statehood status of almost all the Western Balkan states.8 Moreover, while the EU’s request for 
the fulfilment of the Copenhagen accession conditions has, as discussed above, been of great 
assistance to post-communist states, through providing them with advice and guidelines for 
                                                          
8 Of all the Western Balkan states only Croatia, Montenegro and Albania were spared of this ‘fourth layer’ of 




building democratic institutions and a market economy, the EU’s request for compliance with 
its incentives for solving intraregional statehood disputes was often a ‘pure burden’ on the 
Western Balkan states,  which could not have in any way assisted, but only postponed, their 
Europeanization. As argued in Petrovic 2013, chapter 5 (see also Boerzel & Grimm, 2018; 
Bieber, 2011: Noutcheva 2009 and 2012 and Petrovic, 2017) most of these incentives, 
especially those regarding the centralisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the recognition of 
Kosovo’s independence and the resolution of the Greek-Macedonian dispute regarding the 
‘naming issue’ were inappropriately formulated (or not formulated at all, with regards to the 
Greek-Macedonian dispute), with very little respect for the countries’ specifics and realistic 
chances of meeting them. 
      Despite some successes in initiating and managing the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue and 
maintaining peace and stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo (foremost by the use of EU 
civil and military/police missions) these incentives did not consider ‘the strategic behaviour of 
domestic actors and constrains they face…[and therefore] neglect[ed] the rational interests of 
domestic actors and the dynamics of two-level game negotiations’ (Börzel, 2018: 124). As if 
all this was not enough, after the ‘enlargement enthusiasm’ in the core EU member states sunk 
further with the emergence of the global financial and economic crisis of 2008/09, with the 
outbreak of the Eurozone crisis in 2010, and when it became certain that Croatia would join in 
2013; the EU decided to further tighten the accession process for the new candidates, i.e. for 
the Western Balkan states.9 This time the accession conditions were not officially changed, but 
‘the Commission [decided to] put particular emphasis on the three pillars of ‘the rule of law, 
economic governance and public administration reform’ (European Commission, 2014, p.1). 
In other words, it was decided that the accession negotiations chapters which cover these three 
pillars should be opened among the first, and thoroughly negotiated to ensure “a stronger focus 
on addressing fundamental reforms [in the candidate countries] early in the enlargement 
process” (ibid, 1). It was expected that the candidate countries would in this way be better 
prepared for accession (than was the case in the previous enlargement rounds) and therewith 
also ensure that ‘enlargement is not at the expense of the effectiveness of the Union’ (ibid, 1).   
      In this way the WB states were, unlike the ECE and the Baltic post-communist states and 
even their neighbours Bulgaria and Romania, exposed to an ever-increasing number of 
                                                          
9 By that time Turkey’s accession had effectively fallen from the enlargement agenda due to both increased 
opposition to it in the leading EU member states and internal developments in Turkey, particularly Erdogan’s 




conditions that they needed to meet to be Europeanised. While such an EU approach was 
partially grounded on a genuine need to assure the successful building of state and government 
institutions in the largely dysfunctional Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo (and to some 
extent also in Albania which suffered from an enormously high level of corruption and weak 
governance/state institutions) in the case of Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, which by 2006 
were more or less on the same level of consolidating their democratic institutions with that of 
Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, at the time when they opened accession negotiations  (Table 
2, see also  Petrovic and  Smith, 2013) it can be considered as (at least) unnecessary and/or as 
a ‘tool’ for the postponement of the accession of these states.  
     All in all, neither the tightened accession conditions of 2006 nor the ‘three pillar’ approach 
after 2012/2014 have contributed to significant improvements in democratisation in any of the 
Western Balkan states after 2006 (Table 2), but they definitely made further burdens to these 
states’ accession to the EU and their EUropeanisation. In some cases, especially in Macedonia 
and Bosnia-Hercegovina this tightened approach to accession had in fact serious counter effects 
as will be shown in the following section.  
2. Can they be Europeanised? 
Due to developments and reasons discussed in the latter part of the previous section, the process 
of accession and the attendant EUroepanisation of the WB states more or less completely 
stalled during the first half of this decade (see Table 3). The only two exceptions were 
Montenegro and (since 2012 and particularly 2014) Serbia. The moderate progress in accession 
of these two, had however very little to do with their EUropeanisation through the adoption of 
the EU’s norms and values incorporated in the (tightened) Copenhagen accession conditions, 
particularly not those related to the democracy standards and the rule of law (the first and the 
most import pillar in the post-2012 EU ‘three pillars approach’). In accordance to its general 
approach to relations with neighbouring countries that the EU adopted after the emergence of 
enlargement fatigue in the mid-2010s and strengthened during the multiple crises that it faced 
after 2009/2010, the EU has almost exclusively insisted on compliance with its stability and 
security priorities in its relations with the Western Balkan candidates (Pomorska and 
Noutcheva, 2017). As these goals were mainly incorporated in the above discussed ill prepared 
and often controversial EU incentives, such an approach could only have produced mixed, if 
not controversial outcomes. This explains why Montenegro, the country with a problematic 
democratic record, became the regional frontrunner in the accession process.   
    Although Serbia and Macedonia have reached a similar (and in some respects higher) level 




not been led by ‘strong men’, uninterruptedly for nearly three decades, 10 the progress in EU 
accession of these two countries was significantly slower than in the case of Montenegrin. The 
only reason for this was the EU’s assessment of their (mainly unsatisfactory) record in 
contributing to the [re]solution of the statehood disputes in the region. As discussed in greater 
detail in Petrovic 2017, the cornerstone in Serbia’s accession had become its “commitment and 
achieved further progress… in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue’ (EU General Affairs Council, 
2012: 1), whereas Macedonia had to solve its dispute with Greece about its very name. Hence, 
while Montenegro, which did not have to comply with additional political demands related to 
regional stability was invited (despite its internal political tensions) to open the first chapters 
of its accession negotiations ‘only’ three and a half years after it had submitted its application 
for membership, Serbia waited for it full five years (plus one additional year to open the first 
chapters).  Macedonia, which until very recently was not able to make any progress in talks 
with Greece11 is still waiting to open accession negotiations (Table 3).  














Poland 16.12.1991 1.2.1994   1.4. 1994 31.3.1998 12.12.2002 
Hungary 16.12.1991 1.2.1994   8.4.1994 31.3.1998 12.12.2002 
Slovakia*  4.10.1993 1.2.1995   27.6.1995 15.2.2000 12.12.2002 
Latvia 12. 6.1995 1.2.1998 27.10.1995 15.2.2000 12.12.2002 
Lithuania 12. 6.1995 1.2.1998    8.12.1995 15.2.2000 12.12.2002 
Bulgaria   8. 03.1993 1.02.1995 14.12.1995 15.2.2000 16.12.2004 
Romania   1. 02.1993 1.02.1995 22.06.1995 15.2.2000 16.12.2004 
Albania 12.06.2006 1.04.2009 28.04.2009 No No 
Bosnia-Herzeg. 16.06.2008 1.06.2015 15.02.2016 No No 
Croatia 9.04. 2001 1.02.2005 20.02.2003 5.10.2005 30.06.2012 
Macedonia FYR  9.04.2001 1.04.2004 22.03.2004 No No 
Montenegro 15.10.2007 1.05.2010 15.12.2008 16.06.2012 No 
Serbia 29.04.2008 1.09.2013 22.12.2009 14.01.2014provs.** No 
Kosovo 27.10.2015 1/04/2016 No No No 
      *   Czechoslovakia - 16.12.1991 
     ** The first chapters (35 and 32) were opened on 14 December 2015. 
Source: European Commission Archive on Past Enlargements and other documents 
        This approach by the EU to the Western Balkan states’ accession, which prioritised 
regional and national political stability (as it was understood and defined in the respective EU 
                                                          
10Montenegro is the only post-communist state in Europe which has never experienced an electoral change of 
ruling party or leader. The Democratic Party of Montenegrin Socialists (formerly the League of Montenegrin 
Communists) and its leader, Milo Djukanovic have been in power throughout the whole period of post-
communist (and even the last few years of communist) history of the country. Djukanović himself has served six 
terms as prime minister and two as president of the country during this period. He is current President of the 
country, elected in the election held on 18 May 2018 (see e.g. Hopkins, 2012; Tomovic, 2016 and Vachudova, 
2014). 
11 The latest news says that the prime ministers of the two countries were finally able to reach the compromise 
(i.e. find the mutually acceptable name for the southest [most south?] republic of former Yugoslavia) in early 
June. However, the opposition to the adopted name (‘North Makedonija’) is very strong in both countries and 




policy incentives), rather than meeting democracy standards and progressing with other 
necessary socio-economic reforms, has not only further slowed down the accession (and 
therefore Europeanisation) of these states, but it also initiated certain backslide effects on the 
socio-political stability  of these states. These were especially strong in Macedonia and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. While Serbia and Kosovo were able to make some progress (not without the 
considerable assistance of the European Commission and High Representative Mogherini– see 
European Union, 2018) in the ‘Belgrade- Pristina dialogue’ and for it were awarded with some 
headway in the accession process, the accession of both Macedonia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina completely stalled after the late 2000s (Table 3).  
  The EU’s inaction in ‘the naming issue’ and its waiting for the Macedonian and Greek 
political leaderships to solve it more or less by themselves (which they were unable to do for 
almost three decades)12 and the consequent continuous postponement of the opening accession 
negotiations, have started to significantly cool off enlargement expectations (let alone 
enthusiasm) in Macedonia. This has further contributed to an increase of political animosities 
and social unrest that in 2015 and 2016 brought the country to the brink of civil war (see 
Bechev, 2015, Petrovic, 2017). Similarly, in Bosnia and Herzegovina (B-H), the EU in the late 
2000s defined the necessity of the country’s constitutional change towards greater 
centralisation and strengthening of the role of federal institutions as the sine qua non for its 
progress in the SA and accession process. However, this ‘necessity’ was strongly opposed by 
the Bosnian Serb population (and to a large extent by the Bosnian Croats as well) and had zero 
chance of being consensually adopted at the national level (as required by the country’s 
constitution – see e.g. Balkaninside, 2014 and Inserbia.info.,2015). As such it not only stopped 
the country’s progress in the SAP process, but became an additional source of ethnic 
animosities and political conflicts which resulted in destabilisation rather than consolidation of 
democratic institutions in the country as a whole.13 Hence, speaking in terms of 
Europeanisation, it could be said that the EU with the above policy of (non)incentives and  
political demands, obstructed rather than supported the Europeanisation of these two Western 
Balkan states during the first half of this decade. 
       By the mid-2010s, the EU itself began to be aware of the backsliding effects of its state-
building and conflict resolution policies towards these two Western Balkan states. While the 
European Commission stated in its 2015 report on Macedonia (European Commission, 2015a) 
that ‘the last decade’s reforms are being undermined…’the EU council initiated in December 
                                                          
12. Macedonia and Greece had agreed already in 1995, when they formalized bilateral relations to negotiate this 
problem under the auspices of the United Nations; however, these negotiations have been very occasional and 
informal and (until very recently) without any resolute political incentive which could have moved them 
forward. 
13 Since the late 2000s the EU requirements have defined the necessity of the country’s constitutional change in 
the above direction as the sine qua non for its progress in the SAP process and towards EU accession (See e.g. 
European Commission, Annual Progress Reports on Bosnia-Herzegovina for all years in the period 2007-2015 





2014 (EU Foreign Affairs Council, 2014) a change in the EU’s approach towards developments 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina that placed a focus on the solution of the “outstanding socio-
economic challenges it faces” (European Commission 2015, p. 4), rather than on changes to its 
constitutional order. This resulted in the quick adoption of the so-called “Reform Agenda for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2015 – 2018” by all three levels of the government of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (including those of the two entities) in July 2015 (Delegation of the European 
Union…, 2015). The Reform Agenda initiated common reform actions which were supported 
by the leaderships of all three major Bosnian and Herzegovinian ethnic groups and led to the 
adoption of legislative changes for the organisation of the local elections in October 2016, 
alongside some progress in the fight against corruption and organised crime (European 
Commission, 2016, pp. 5-6). These positive steps in the implementation of the Agenda were 
relatively quickly rewarded with the EU’s decision to allow the Bosnian and Herzegovinian 
leadership to formally submit its application for EU membership in February 2016 (Table 3).  
During 2015 and 2016 the EU and the Commission in particular were also busy trying to handle 
explosive developments in Macedonia (Bechev, 2015; Petrovic, 2017) which were  brought 
back to ‘normal’ only after negotiations led by EU Commissioner Hahn brokered an agreement 
between the four Macedonian major parties on a ‘tender truce’ and the early elections in April 
2016 (European Commission, 2015b). After using various sets of reasons and excuses, the semi 
authoritarian Gruevski government was able to postpone these elections to November 2016. 
The elections were eventually won by Gruevski’s centre right VMRO party, but with a very 
slim majority which did not enable it to form the new government. After several months of 
negotiations there was formed the current coalition government led by Prime Minister Zaev 
(see e.g. Testorides, 2017) the leader of the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM). 
As discussed earlier, ‘less nationalist’ and more open to compromise Zaev was able to finally 
solve the ‘naming issue’ in early June 2018 (Tzallas, 2018) and in that way pave the way for 
his country to open the accession negotiations with the EU (most likely) by the end of this year.  
After it was briefly interrupted in 2016 and early 2017 by the initial shock of Brexit and the 
migrant crisis, the EU seems to have continued with its pro-active approach to the accession 
ambitions of the Western Balkan states, i.e. to their EUropeanisation through the accession 
process. The first encouraging signs came with the victory of pro-EU parties and candidates in 
the Dutch parliamentary and French presidential elections in April and May 2018, with 
optimism and expectations among the Western Balkan political elites raised after the European 
Commission President Junker’s announcement in his 2017 State of the Union speech 
(European Commission, 2017)  that the EU can expect to enlarge its membership by 2025. 
However, the European Commission’s Western Balkan Enlargement Strategy issued in 
February 2018 (European Commission, 2018) and even some of Junker’s own later 
‘clarifications’ have considerably cooled this optimism and once more sent mixed signals to 
the Western Balkan candidates for EU membership. Although the basic message of the strategy 
and the later issued Commission’s progress reports on the Western Balkan candidates and 
potential candidates for membership, should have remained ‘in line’ with Junker’s optimistic 




under which this could happen can hardly be considered encouraging for the Western Balkan 
aspirants to EU membership. The clear specification of an additional accession condition for 
all the Western Balkan membership candidates - a requirement that they need to solve all their 
‘bilateral disputes…as a matter of urgency’ (European Commission 2018, p. 7) - seems to be 
particularly demanding and challenging for the regional political elites. While Montenegro 
hopes to solve its only remaining (though nearly thirty-year-old) dispute with Croatia over the 
sea border relatively soon, the second regional frontrunner for EU membership, Serbia, and 
most of the remaining Western Balkan states have, as shown above, many more (and more 
serious) problems to resolve with their neighbours.   
 
Only time will tell whether a relatively quick resolution of the ‘naming issue’ between 
Macedonia and Greece after the adoption of the February strategy is merely a historical 
coincidence, or a sign that this latest additional accession condition for the Western Balkan 
states will not be as tough as previously, and that the EU has finally decided to EUropean-ise 
this small part of its immediate neighbourhood.  
 
Conclusion 
The slower EUropeanisation of the Western Balkan states in comparison with their post-
communist counterparts that joined the EU in the previous enlargement rounds is not caused 
by their inadequate structural capacity to adopt core EU values and norms. Rather, it is the 
result of decisions made by political elites in the Western Balkan states and in the EU, i.e. its 
leading Western member states. While all the Western Balkan states as well as Bulgaria and 
Romania were ruled by illiberal political leaders during the 1990s, who were not interested in 
the EUuropeanisation of their countries, the reasons for the postponed EUropeanisation of these 
states in the 2010s should be primarily sought in the lack of genuine interest of political elites 
in core EU member states in EU enlargement into the Western Balkans.  Instead of providing 
more technical and financial assistance for reform which could have enabled the Western 
Balkan candidates and potential candidates for accession to meet the accession conditions 
easier, the EU after 2006 tightened the Copenhagen conditions for them and started to subject 
their accession to the fulfilment of additional political conditions which have little to do with 
EU values and norms but much more with regional stability and security. While Montenegro 
and Albania (and earlier Croatia) were spared requirements to comply with the additional EU 
conditions related to intraregional and national disputes about statehood status, progress in the 
accession process of other candidates for EU membership from the Western Balkans in recent 
years has almost exclusively been determined by the EU’s assessments of their compliance 
with these conditions. These additional conditions (or EU incentives) were often 
inappropriately formulated, with very little respect for a country’s specifics and realistic 
chances of meeting them. Hence, it could be said that the EU has since 2006 adopted an 






Time will tell whether recent indications of a change to the EU’s approach towards accession 
of the Western Balkans are a sign of genuine interest in the faster Europeanisation of these 
states. Faster or slower, Europeanisation of the Western Balkans is a matter of political will 
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